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Abstract ― An increase in the wage share has contradictory effects on the subaggregates of 
aggregate demand. Private consumption expenditures ought to increase because wage incomes 
typically are associated with higher consumption propensities than capital incomes. Investment 
expenditures ought to be negatively affected because investment will positively depend on 
profits. Net exports will be negatively affected because an increase in the wage share 
corresponds to an increase in unit labor costs and thus a loss in competitiveness. Theoretically 
aggregate demand can therefore be either wage led or profit led depending on how these effects 
add up. The results will crucially depend on how open the economy is internationally. The 
paper estimates a Post-Kaleckian macro model incorporating these effects for the Euro area and 
finds that the Euro area is presently in a wage-led demand regime. Implications for wage 
policies are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Maintaining international competitiveness has become one of the prime policy objectives of 
European politics. The Lisbon Agenda aims at making Europe the world’s most competitive 
economic region. In a recent publication the European Commission (2006) argues that 
„productivity increases, combined with wage moderation, should help to maintain the EU’s 
competitive position in an increasingly integrated world economy“ and encourages member 
states to „ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage setting 
mechanisms“ ( European Commission 2006, p.40). The term “employment-friendly labour 
costs developments” is not defined in the text, but from the context it is clear to mean wage 
moderation.5
 
These policy recommendations, it seems, are heeded by wage setters. The wage share in the 
Euro area has fallen by 11.6 %-points since 1981 – without a substantial improvement of 
economic performance. Growth rates (of real GDP) remain well below those of the 1960s and 
1970s (Figure 1a). Not only has growth been disappointing, the unemployment rate in the 
Euro-area has increased from already high levels in 1981 by 1.2% points – despite an almost 
continuous decline in the wage share (Figure 1b).6 Europa has experienced 25 years of 
„employment-friendly“ wage policy, without employment improving.  
 
                                                 
5 Wage moderation, in this paper, is defined as real wage growth below productivity growth. 
6 Adjusted wage share at market prices (source: AMECO).  
Figure 1a. Adjusted wage share and GDP growth 
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Figure 1b. Adjusted wage share and unemployment 
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While it is straightforward that wage moderation will, other things equal, improve 
competitiveness and therefore ultimately net exports, it is not obvious that an improvement of 
competitiveness will automatically improve growth and employment. Foreign trade is only 
one component of final demand. The other components include consumption and investment 
(as well as the state sector). To assess the effects of wage moderation it is necessary to 
address the effects on all three components of private demand. In the Euro area, exports and 
imports only account for only 13.1% and 12.6% of GDP respectively (in 2003 at current 
prices), for the EU 25 the shares are 8.8% and 9.9%. This research is thus motivated by the 
hypothesis that wage moderation is likely to have only moderate affects on foreign trade but 
substantial effects on domestic demand.  
 
The analysis is inspired by the work of Keynes and Kalecki. The model is a version of the 
model presented by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). It is a Post-Kaleckian macro model that 
allows for wage-led as well as for profit-led demand regimes according to the relative size of 
the consumption differential, the sensitivity of investment to profits and the sensitivity of net 
exports to unit labor costs.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background and the post-
Kaleckian model, on which the empirical estimations are based. Section 3 summarizes the 
empirical literature on these models. Section 4 presents the econometric results for the effect 
of changes in functional income distribution on private consumption, private investment and 
net exports. Section 5 summarizes the key findings and draws policy conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical background: wage-led und profit-led demand regimes 
This section will present a Post-Keynesian model based on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) that 
forms the basis for the empirical investigation. It is used to analyze the effects of changes in 
functional income distribution on aggregate demand. While in the classical Kaleckian model 
(for a closed economy) an increase in the wage share will always lead to an increase in 
demand (Kalecki 1954, Blecker 1999), this is not necessarily the case in the Bhaduri-Marglin 
model. Here profit-led as well as wage-led demand regimes are possible since a positive effect 
of profits on investment is allowed for. The question whether the positive effect of wages on 
consumption or the negative effect of profits on investment is larger, becomes an empirical 
one. In an open economy additional negative effects will operate through net exports. 
 
Aggregate demand (Y) is the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), net exports (NX) 
and government expenditure (G). All variables are in real terms. In a general formulation, 
consumption, investment and net exports are written as function of income (Y), the wage 
share (Ω), and some other control variables (summarized as z). These latter are assumed to be 
independent of output and distribution. Government expenditures are considered a function of 
output only. Aggregate demand then is: 
 
),(),,(),,(),( GNXI zYGzYNXzYIYCY +Ω+Ω+Ω=      (1) 
 
This model is rather general in that it can be reduced to a standard model. Most 
macroeconomic models pay little attention to the effects of income distribution on 
consumption and investment. Only in the net exports function does income distribution 
usually play a role, albeit in an indirect way. Typically export and import functions include a 
price term and prices are thought to depend (among other things) on unit labor costs. Unit 
labor costs are closely related to the wage share. The above model therefore denegerates into 
a standard model if ∂C/∂Ω and ∂I/∂Ω are assumed to be zero. 
 
The inclusion of income distribution shall briefly be motivated. In the consumption function 
the basic assertion is that wage incomes (W) and profit incomes (R) are associated with 
different propensities to consume. The Kaleckian assumption is that the marginal propensity 
to save is higher for capital incomes than for wage income; consumption is therefore expected 
to increase when the wage share rises. 
 
Standard investment functions depend on output (Y) and the long-term real interest rate or 
some other measure of the cost of capital. In our model investment is expected to decrease 
when the wage share rises because future profits may be expected to fall. In addition it is 
often argued that retained earnings are a privileged source of finance and may thus influence 
investment expenditures.  
 
Net exports are a negative function of domestic demand, a positive function of foreign 
demand, and will depend negatively on unit labour costs (ULC), which are an indicator of 
international competitiveness. ULC are by definiton closely related to the wage share. In 
macroeconometric models ULC usually affect prices and prices enter the export and import 
function. 
 
Government expenditures can react to income distribution; however this is ignored in our 
analysis, which focuses on the private sector. A serious treatment of the public sector is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
The resulting model is of a basic private open economy type and has several 
simplifications. Because of our focus on the effect of changes in the functional income 
distribution the effects of fiscal policy is excluded from the analysis. Income distribution, i.e. 
the wage share (Ω),7 is taken as exogenous. Thus feedbacks, for example, from growth on 
income distribution via lower unemployment and a better bargaining position of labour are 
ignored at this stage.8  
 
Differentiating Y with respect to Ω and collecting terms gives 
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The term 1/(1-h1) in equation 2 is a standard multiplier and has to be positive for stability. The 
sign of the total derivative will therefore depend on the sign of the numerator. h2 is the sum of 
the partial derivatives of the components of demand with respect to income distribution. This 
sum is private excess demand, that is, the change in demand caused by a change in income 
distribution given a certain level of income. It is impossible to sign h2 a priori, since we 
hypothesize that ∂C/∂Ω>0, ∂I/∂Ω<0, and ∂NX/∂Ω<0. The sum of these effects can therefore 
only be determined empirically. Determining the sign of private excess demand is therefore 
the focus of the empricial estimations in this study. 
 
The total effect of the increase in the wage share on aggregate depends on the relative size 
of the reactions of the components of GDP, namely consumption, investment and net exports 
to changes in income distribution. If it is positive (∂Y*/∂Ω>0), the demand regime is called 
wage-led. If the effect is negative (∂Y*/∂Ω<0), it is called profit-led. 
                                                 
7 Functional income distribution and its measure, the wage share, are used synonymously throughout this paper. 
8 Endogenizing income distributions raises substantial theoretical as well as econometric issues. It would require 
a different estimation strategy. Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) present a system estimator approach. 
Empirically, given the high levels of international trade, one would expect net exports to 
play a major role in determining the overall outcome. However, while individual countries 
can increase demand by increasing exports, the world as a whole of course cannot. Therefore 
it is important to distinguish between the domestic sector of the economy and the open 
economy. The domestic sector in this case is defined with respect to consumption and 
investment only, assuming that the net export position does not change (as would be the result 
if wages were to change simultaneously in all countries). If consumption reacts more 
sensitively to an increase in the wage share than investment, domestic demand will be wage-
led. Then we will integrate the effects of the foreign sector, thus changes in net exports to 
obtain the aggregate effect in an open economy. 
 
3. Related literature 
 
The first paper in the empirical literature on the Bhaduri-Marglin models is that of Bowles 
and Boyer (1995). They estimated the model by means of separate single equations for 
savings, investment and net exports for six OECD economies. The exposition of the model 
and the testing strategy are seminal, however the econometric methods employed are not up-
to-date. In particular, they fail to discuss the time series properties of the economic variables 
and ignore the issue of unit roots. As a consequence, they do not apply difference or error 
correction models that form the core of modern time series econometrics. The models are 
estimated in shares rather than in log levels. No discussion of robustness is offered. Moreover, 
Bowles and Boyer use the employment share as a proxy for capacity utilization. For European 
countries with a high persistence of unemployment this may be a misleading indicator.  
 
Gordon (1995a) estimates consumption and investment as a function of income distribution 
for the USA. In a VAR model, various exogenous shocks are simulated. Gordon (1995b) 
extends the model for an open economy and investigates reactions of aggregate demand on 
changes in income distribution empirically for the USA. His conclusion is that the growth 
regime of the USA is profit-led. 
 
Hein and Krämer (1997) as well as Hein and Ochsen (2003) in their studies employ a 
model for a closed economy based on Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). Hein and Ochsen (2003) 
extend the model with the interest rate as exogenous variable and elaborate various 
accumulation regimes, depending on the sensitivity of the savings function and the investment 
function to the interest rate. In the empirical part, they estimate savings and investment 
econometrically and try to characterise the accumulation regimes of France, Germany, the 
USA and the UK. 
 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) estimate a structural VAR model consisting of the 
variables capital accumulation, capacity utilization, profit share, unemployment rate and 
labour productivity growth for the USA, UK and France. Employing a VAR model, the 
mutual interaction of the variables is incorporated. The goods market is simulated by a model 
based on Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). It is supplemented by an equation for income 
distribution, a productivity function and a function for unemployment. From the empirical 
investigation it is concluded that unemployment is determined by the goods market, but that 
the impact of income distribution on demand and employment is very weak. Technical 
progress is shifting income distribution in favour of profits. Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) 
employ a similar model for Turkey and Korea. 
 
Naastepad (2006) presents and estimates a model for the Netherlands, in which 
productivity growth is modeled explicitly. Productivity, savings, investment and exports are 
estimated by single equations. She finds that “the Dutch demand regime during 1960-2000 is 
(…) wage-led” (p. 24), however only narrowly so. Overall she concludes that “the growth rate 
of Dutch aggregate demand is relatively insensitive to changes in real wage growth” (p. 29) in 
the postwar period. 
 
Naastepad and Storm (2006/2007) estimate a similar model for eight OECD countries that 
is similar in spirit to the one used here, but differs in detail. The model estimated is strictly 
derived from the theoretical one. Consequently the estimated equations are typically in ratio 
form, which are not the ones favoured by modern time series econometrics. No explicit 
attention is paid to the issues of unit roots. Naastepad and Storm find wage-led demand 
regimes in all European countries and profit-led ones in Japan and the USA. Compared to our 
findings, the estimated effects on consumption and investment are high, but those on net 
exports are modest.  
 
Ederer and Stockhammer (2007) apply a single equation approach to France and estimate 
consumption, investment and net export functions. As their study is a prequel to the present 
paper, the estimation strategy is similar, with some changes in the treatment of export and 
imports. The result is that the French aggregate demand regime is domestically wage led, but 
international trade turns the demand regime into a profit-led one. 
 
Hein and Vogel (2007) use a similar approach for Austria, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, UK and the USA. In the estimation they largely follow Ederer and Stockhammer 
(2007) with minor differences in the investment specification and some differences in the net 
export function. Surprisingly, they fail to find effects of income distribution on net exports in 
four out of six countries. They also fail to find effects on investment in four out of six 
countries. Consequently they find profit-led demand regimes only in Austria and the 
Netherlands, which are also the ones where effects on net exports had been found. The other 
countries are found to be wage-led. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
The model will be estimated by means of separate single equations for consumption, 
investment, exports, and imports. The key differences to the literature are the following. First, 
the econometric specifications differ. Following standard practice in modern econometric 
modelling, error-correction models (ECM) are applied whenever feasible. Where results were 
unsatisfactory and/or there was no indication of cointegration, an unrestricted autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) model was estimated to infer which time series specification would be 
appropriate. ADL models are general in that various time series specifications can be written 
as restrictions on an ADL models. In all cases where the ECM specification did not work, 
ADL specifications suggested that the difference form was applicable. Second, as far as 
possible the specifications were chosen such as to be consistent with the standard literature 
and augmented for a distributional variable. Unfortunately there are few reference models for 
the Euro area (that is aggregate models working with annual data). The ECB Area-wide 
Model (henceforth: AWM; Fagan, Henry and Mestre 2001), would be an obvious starting 
point. However, the AWM is characterized by numerous theoretically motivated restrictions 
that make it incomparable with our model. 
 
There are two major qualifications that apply for all the results to be reported. First, functional 
income distribution is assumed to be exogenous. Obviously this is not the case. Demand will 
affect functional income distribution in at least two ways: mark ups typically vary 
procyclically (for example if mark ups are set on normal unit labor costs) and unemployment 
will typically (though usually with a time lag) have a negative effect on the wage share. 
Endogenizing income distribution would require a different modelling strategy (Stockhammer 
and Onaran 2004 estimate a similar model for different countries by means of a structural 
VAR).  
 
Second, the Euro-area is treated as one unit in the estimations, that is, even for the period 
prior to monetary unification. It is thus assumed that a behavioral function can reasonably be 
reconstructed for say the 1960s. Attention was thus paid to potential structural breaks, 
however it turns out that Chow tests and experimentation with dummy variables (around the 
times of EU extensions) were usually not statistically significant and did not alter results 
substantially. Thus it seems that, at least statistically, the Euro-area can be treated as one area 
prior to its coming into existence. 
 
All data is taken from the AMECO database (downloaded in summer 2006), which offers 
aggregate data for the Euro-area for all relevant series. C, I, NX, X, M, Y, W and R are real 
consumption expenditures, investment expenditures, net exports, exports (of goods), imports 
(of goods), GDP, wages and profits respectively. Wages and profits were deflated with the 
GDP deflator. Variable definitions can be found in the Appendix (Table A.1). Unit root tests 
suggest that all these variables are integrated of order one (I(1)). Thus ECM, cointegration, 
ADL, or difference specifications are applicable. 
 
4.1 Consumption  
 
The consumption function estimated is of the general form ),( RWfC = . This closely 
resembles standard consumption functions except that income is split into wage income and 
profit income. For econometric reasons the variables enter the estimation in logarithmic form. 
The difference in marginal savings propensities (between wage and profit incomes) gives the 
change of a redistribution of income. 
 
Table 1 reports the regression results for the ADL specification and several difference 
specifications. The ECM specification did not give meaningful and statistically significant 
results for the long run effects. Moreover, the ADF test unambiguously rejected cointegration 
(in log levels). In the case of the consumption function this is somewhat surprising, since 
consumption functions can usually be modeled with ECM. The ADL specification (1) clearly 
indicates a specification in differences. The latter was thus applied. Moderate autocorrelation 
problems persist in various difference specifications. This may be due to the fact that wages 
and profits are pre-tax values. It was not possible to calculate disposable incomes for wage 
and profit incomes, because various taxes cannot be assigned. The tax rates may thus be the 
missing variables that show up as a serially correlated error term. A standard correction for 
first order autocorrelation was thus applied to some specifications. The results are hardly 
affected by this. 
 
Table 1. Regression results for consumption equation 
  1 2 3 4  
Dep. Variable: ln C Δln C Δln C Δln C 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
const. 0,160 0,420 0,010 6,874 0,014 5,858 0,003 0,762
ln W 0,380 4,082     
ln W(-1) -0,390 -3,885     
ln R 0,120 1,596     
ln R(-1) -0,110 -1,607     
ln C(-1) 0,980 14,614     
Δln W    0,490 9,907 0,468 7,440 0,741 7,103
Δln R    0,110 1,671 0,108 1,622 0,259  
AR(1)       0,254 1,629 0,457 2,717
Adj, R² 1,000   0,780 0,778  0,549  
DW stat. 1,620   1,450  1,996   2,137   
Note: C is real private consumption, W real wages and R real profits. Specification 4 imposes that the coefficents 
of wages and profits add up to one. Estimation period 1962-2005. 
 
In the basic difference specification (specification 2) the consumption elasticity for wages and 
profits are 0.49 and 0.11 respectively. The former being statistically significant at the 1% 
level, the latter is not statistically significant at conventional levels, but close to the 10% level. 
These elasticities may appear rather low. In the long run, one would expect a value much 
closer to unity.9 However, the wage and profit variable are pre-tax (and also include social 
security contributions). The tax rate has a rising trend over part of our sample period, which 
may explain why gross income elasticities of consumption are below one. Correcting for first 
order autocorrelation (specification 3) virtually does not affect the coefficient estimates. 
Specification (4) imposes that consumption function (in differences) is homogenous of degree 
1 in wages and profits. The elasticity of wages then is 0.74 and that of profits 0.26 
(statistically significant at 1%). 
 
                                                 
9 Note that since the estimation is in logarithms, our estimation equation implies a consumption function that is 
Cobb-Douglas. Therefore the coefficients on wages and profits add up to the elasticity of income.  
The hypothesis that consumption propensities vary between profit and wage income is 
confirmed. Converting elasticities into marginal effects will give different results according to 
where the partial effect is evaluated. Therefore we calculate two marginal effects, one at the 
mean of our sample and one at its end, which is the year 2005. At the sample mean the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wages is 0.52, whereas that out of profits is 0.15, 
which gives a consumption differential of 0.37.10 At the levels of 2005 the consumption 
propensities are 0.58 and 0.16 respectively, which gives a consumption differential of 0.43. 
This change in the consumption differential is due to the substantial shift in income 
distribution since 1980. Since the coefficient estimate for the coefficient on profits is not 
statistically significant different from zero, this has to be regarded as the lower bound of the 
value. A redistribution of 1%-point of GDP from profits to wages would thus induce 
additional consumption expenditures of 0.43 %-points of GDP in 2005 (and 0.37 at the 
sample mean). The restricted version of the estimation gives a consumption differential of 
0.51 in 2005 and 0.44 at the sample mean. However, the former estimate is preferred because 
the restriction is expected to be valid for net rather than gross income.  
 
4.2 Investment 
 
The investment function estimated is of the general form ),,( iRYfI = . As the coefficients 
are interpreted as the effects in one variable, keeping the other variables constant, the 
coefficient estimate on profits will give the effect of an increase in profits given the level of 
income (and the interest) and therefore a change in income distribution. 
                                                 
10 Because a lograithmic consumption function was estimated, the consumption function is of the Cobb-Douglas 
type. If the “true” relation is addiditive in levels rather than in logarithms, this can only be regarded as an 
approximation. An estimation in levels gives qualitatively similar results but is fraught with (serious) 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems. 
 The investment function was estimated in an ECM form with the restriction that in the long 
run the investment share in GDP is stable, that is, the long run coefficient of output on 
investment is unity.11 The investment function includes the profits and the (ex post) real long 
term interest rate (deflated with the GDP deflator). After experimentation with the lag 
structure of the differenced variables, a structure with one lag for the short run effects was 
adopted. The results are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Regression results for investment equation 
  ECM ECM with lags 
Dep. Variable: Δln I Δln I 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
const. -0.300 -3.248 -0.590 -4.033 
Δln Y 1.890 6.248 1.590 4.885 
Δln Y(-1)   0.840 2.355 
Δln R 0.130 0.698 0.380 1.965 
Δln R(-1)   -0.180 -0.894 
ln I(-1)/Y(-1) -0.140 -2.820 -0.210 -3.130 
ln R(-1) 0.010 0.512 0.030 1.910 
i (-1)     0.000 -0.808 
Adj, R² 0.720  0.730  
DW stat. 1.730   1.750   
Note: I is real private investment, Y real GDP, R real profits and i the long-term real interest rate. Estimation 
period 1968-2005 
 
The regression performs reasonably well overall. In accordance with the literature (Chirinko 
1993, Ford and Poret 1992) demand is playing the key role in determining investment 
expenditures. The accelerator effects are well above two (1.59+0.84) in the short run and have 
                                                 
11 A similar investment function with the same restriction was used by Baumgartner, Breuss and Kaniovski 
(2005). Hein and Vogel (2007) use different specification for different countries. They utilize the profit share 
rather than profits. Naastepad and Storm (2006) estimate investment as ln(I/Y)=f(ln(R/Y),ln(Y)). The 
coefficients of the latter can be readily transformed to be comparable with our results. The time series properties 
of the variables, however, are inconsistent, because ln(Y) is typically I(1), whereas I/Y and R/Y supposedly are 
I(0). 
been restricted to one in the long run. The interest rate has the expected sign, but is not 
statistically significant. The long-run elasticity of profits is 0.15 and statistically significant 
only at the 10% level. Again this is line with the literature. While firm-level investment 
functions usually find a larger effect of cash flow on investment (Fazzari and Mott 1986), in 
aggregate investment functions this effect is more tenuous (Chirinko 1993). Our results 
correspond to a marginal effect of profits on investment of 0.07.12 Since the investment to 
profit ratio is stable in the sample period, the partial effects are virtually identical at the mean 
and in 2005. 
 
4.3 Net exports 
 
As the estimation of the net export effect is probably the most sensitive part of the estimation, 
two estimation methods were applied. First the net exports (as a share of GDP) were 
estimated directly as a function of domestic GDP growth, the GDP growth of the most 
important trading partners, nominal exchange rates and real unit labor costs 
( ),,,( RULCEYYf
Y
NX
w= ). This approach closely corresponds to the theoretical model.13 
However, it is not consistent with the import and export functions as currently used in most 
macroeconometric models, since in these prices rather than unit labor costs enter import and 
export functions. Throughout this section unit labor costs, rather than the wage share, will be 
used as explanatory variable, since this variable is the one that is relevant for competitiveness 
                                                 
12 This is the conversion from elasticities to partial effects: 
R
Ie
R
I
IR=∂
∂
. 
13 The net export equations estimated by Naastepad and Storm (2006) and by Hein and Vogel (2007) are similar 
to this one. The former use exports (rather than net exports) as dependent variable and relative ULC as 
explanatory variable. The latter estimate the above equation without the nominal exchange rate and with the 
profit share instead of RULC.  
and the effects of (changes in) real unit labor costs can easily be converted into effects of 
(changes in) the wage share.14
 
A second approach follows standard modeling practice more closely. Here domestic prices (or 
export prices) enter the export and import functions. In a second estimation equation domestic 
prices are estimated as a function of nominal unit labor costs and import prices. This latter 
equation also allows to calculate by how much an increase in real unit labor costs (of say one 
percent) will (on the average) raise domestic prices.  
 
For the trading partners’ GDP a trade-weighted GDP based on the trade shares of the year 
1990-2005 was calculated for the largest trading partners. From 1992 on these include Eastern 
European countries and China, prior to 1992 only OECD countries. In the same fashion a 
trade-weighted effective exchange rate was calculated. 
 
Unfortunately export and import data for extra-EU12 trade only exists for goods, but not for 
services. Thus all estimations had to be performed for goods trade only and then the results 
were multiplied by a fixed factor (1.25, which is the share in the year 2005 for which data 
exists) to account for trade in services. For the USA data on trade in goods and services exist 
and the share of services in total exports and imports is stable (with temporary changes in the 
1970s, which are presumably due to the oil price shock). Thus, the error arising from our 
adjustment for EU trade is probably small. 
 
                                                 
14 Real unit labor costs are 
EE
ET
Y
WRULC = , where ET and EE stand for total employment and dependent 
employment respectively. In the conversion differences between consumer prices and GDP-prices are ignored. 
Since we are interested in medium term developments and the two indices are highly correlated over longer 
periods, an additional step in lengthy transformation is avoided. 
The time series properties for the variables used in the following specifications are not 
straightforward. Unit root tests suggest at the 5% level that NX/Y and ln Px/Pm are I(0) as 
expected, ln E is also I(0) and RULC is I(1). The latter is surprising since RULC is a also a 
ratio. Ln Yw also seems to be I(0). For consistence ln Yw and ln Y are both treated as I(1). In 
the case of RULC experiments with additional lags were performed. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the estimations of the net export share according to the first, 
direct estimation strategy. Table 3 reports two specifications where RULC is entered in levels 
and one (specification 3) where it is entered in difference form. The unit root tests suggest the 
latter specificiation. However this specification implies that changes in the unit labor costs 
have a one time effect on net exports, which is to say there is no long-term effect. From an 
economic point of view this is not plausible. Therefore specifications 1 and 2 are preferred. In 
specifications 1 and 2 all variables show the expected sign and, with the exception of the 
exchange rate, are statistically significant at the 5% level. Specification 1 was performed with 
an autocorrelation correction (for first order autocorrelation). Autcorrelation problems persist, 
however the coefficient estimates seem to be robust.  A 1% increase in real unit labor costs 
leads to a 0.08% decrease of net exports (of goods). After appropriate transformation this the 
effect of a 1%-point increase in the wage share leads to a 0.13%-point (of GDP) of net exports 
in goods and services.15 In specification 3 RULC enter in difference form. The coefficient 
estimate for RULC is not statistically significant at 10% level. The other variables are barely 
affected by this change in specification. The coeffient estimate from specification 1 forms the 
basis for later calculations. 
 
                                                 
15 Real unit labor costs have to be adjusted for the ratio of total employment to dependent employment. This 
value is 1.27. See Marterbauer and Walterskirchen (2003) for more discussion on the relation of wage shares and 
unit labor costs. These values are also summarized in Table 6. 
Table 3. Regression results for net export share equation 
  1 2 3 
Dep. Variable: NX / Y NX / Y NX / Y 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
const. 0.046 1.852 0.053 3.836 -0.006 -2.368
Δln Y -0.185 -4.334 -0.120 -2.285 -0.201 -4.342
Δln Yw 0.131 2.898 0.137 2.304 0.116 2.526
ln E -0.012 -1.012 -0.014 -1.347 -0.007 -0.546
RULC -0.084 -2.133 -0.095 -4.396   
ΔRULC     -0.147 -1.472
AR (1) 0.667 5.383     0.747 7.632
Adj. R² 0.719  0.462  0.708  
DW stat. 1.469   0.688   1.549   
Note: NX are the net exports, Y real GDP, Yw real GDP of the main trading partners, E a trade-weighted 
exchange rate, RULC the real unit labour costs. Estimation period 1962-2005. 
 
The second estimation strategy is more roundabout. In a first step exports are estimated as 
function of prices (and other control variables) and in a second step prices are estimated as 
function of (nominal) unit labor costs (and other control variables). Then the same procedure 
is applied to imports. Table 4 summarizes the results of the export function. The explanatory 
variables are export prices relative to import prices (measured in a hypothetical world 
currency),16 the output of trading partners and the exchange rates. Since no support for a 
cointegrating relation was found, the equation was estimated in difference form. A correction 
for first order autocorrelation was applied. The coefficients have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. The results indicate that a one percent 
increase in foreign demand leads to a 1.34% increase of exports (of goods). Exports also react 
strongly to the exchange rate, with an elasticity of -1.54. The coefficient on relative prices is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and has an elasticity of -1.17. 
 
Table 4. Regression results for export and import equations 
  1     2   3   
                                                 
16 Pmwc = Pm*E 
Dep. Variable: Δln X Dep. Variable: Δln M Δln M 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Variable Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
const. 0.018 0.905 const. -0.006 -0.309 -0.034 -1.555
Δln Yw 1.337 2.322 Δln Y 1.977 3.219 2.339 3.868
Δln E -1.537 -5.274 Δln E(-1) 0.364 1.580   
Δln Px/Pmwc -1.173 -3.173 Δln P(-1)/Pmwc(-1) 0.007 0.029   
AR (1) 0.415 2.795 Δln P(-1)/Pmeu(-1)  0.183 0.941
      T95     0.058 2.653
Adj. R² 0.388  Adj. R² 0.247  0.326  
DW stat. 1.802   DW stat. 1.742   1.938   
Note. Yw is the GDP of main trade partners, E the trade-weighted exchange rate. Px the export price deflator, 
Pmwc the import price deflator in a (hypothetical, trade-weighted) world currency, Y is GDP, P the GDP-
deflator, Pmeu is the import price deflator in euros. T95 is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 from 
1995. Estimation period 1962-2005. 
 
For the import estimation a difference equation was applied after cointegration tests failed. 
Overall, the import regression did not work very well. While domestic demand consistently 
has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the (1% level), the domestic price level, 
import prices and the exchange rate frequently had perverse signs and/or were statistically 
insignificant. In particular, contemporaneous prices showed “perverse” signs (possibly 
because of a J-curve effect). Table 4 reports two specifications. Specification 2 includes the 
exchange rate and the ratio of domestic to import prices (in world currency), both lagged. 
Relative prices in this specification are not statistically significant and the coefficient estimate 
has a value that is economically negligible. Specification 3 includes domestic prices and 
import prices (in domestic currency), both lagged. In addition a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one from 1995 onwards was used.17 Since this specification was adopted after 
experimentation, inference based on t-values may be misleading (Charemza and Deadman 
1997, chap 2). This specification is one of the few, where the domestic price level has the 
expected sign and an economically significant coefficient, though at 0.18 it is low and it is not 
                                                 
17 The motivation for this dummy variable is purely statistical. One possible explanation is the increased 
integration with Eastern Europe after the fall of the wall. 
statistically significant. Domestic GDP on the other hand is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The estimated income elasticity of imports is 2.34 which is rather high.18 The 
conclusion thus is that domestic prices have a weak, if any, effect on imports. Based on our 
results a coefficient estimate of zero is equally arguable. 
 
In two auxiliary regressions the inflation (of the GDP deflator) was explained by (nominal) 
ULC and import prices and export prices were explained by domestic prices and import 
prices. Both estimations were performed in difference form (after ECM specifications proved 
unsuccessful) and autocorrelation procedures had to be applied. An increase of nominal unit 
labor costs by 1% increases domestic inflation by 0.45. An increase of domestic prices by 1% 
increases export prices by 0.47. From the price equation it can be derived that nominal unit 
labor costs have to increase by 1.82% such that real unit labor costs increase by 1% (because 
prices would rise by 0.82%). 
 
                                                 
18 This value is high compared to the demand elasticity of exports. Our results imply that if the EU and its trade 
partners grow at the same rate, the EU would experience a widening current account deficit, which is not very 
plausible.  
Table 5. Regression results for price equations 
Dep. Variable: Δln P Dep. Variable: Δln PX 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Variable Coeff. t-stat.
C 0.029 3.087 C 0.000 -0.921
Δln PM 0.036 2.269 Δln PM 0.510 15.943
Δln ULC 0.449 7.139 Δln P 0.470 4.648
AR(1) 0.887 12.038 AR(1) 0.440 3.161
         
Adj. R² 0.950   Adj. R² 0.940  
DW stat. 2.120 DW stat. 2.150   
Note: P is the GDP deflator, PM the import price deflator, PX the export price deflator and ULC the nominal 
unit labour costs. Estimation period 1962-2005. 
 
The calculation of the effects of a change in income distribution on exports and imports 
involves several steps. These are summarized in Table 6. As import and export shares display 
a clear trend (reflecting globalisation), the transformation from elasticities to marginal effects 
will yield different results according to the point (in time) where marginal effects are 
calculated. Values for mean exports and imports as well as value at the end of the period are 
reported. 
 
The total effect of a change in functional income distribution on exports includes the effect of 
real unit labor costs on prices, the effect of prices on export prices. This value has to be 
transformed from an elasticity into a marginal effect. 19 Then the effects of changes in the unit 
labor costs have to be transformed to effects of changes in the wage share. The result of this 
has to be adjusted for services. These transformations are summarized in Table 6. Overall an 
increase in the wage share by 1%-point currently leads to a reduction in exports by 0.12%-
points of GDP. In the middle of the sample (roughly the 1970s) the respective effect would 
have been 0.08%-points of GDP. The corresponding values of the reduction of imports are 
0.04 and 0.03 %-points of GDP.  
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 Table 6. Calculation of partial effects on net exports, exports and imports  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Net exports    ePRULC 1/RULC   ET/ED G&S/G Effect 
NX/Y -0,084     1,27 1,25 -0,13 
         
Exports eXPx  ePxP     X/Y       
 2005 -1.17 0.47 0.82 1.76 0.10 1.18 1.25 -0.12 
mean -1.17 0.47 0.82 1.58 0.07 1.27 1.25 -0.08 
         
Imports eMP       M/Y       
2005 0.18  0.82 1.76 0.11 1.18 1.25 0.04 
mean 0.18   0.82 1.58 0.08 1.27 1.25 0.03 
Note: column (1) estimates from Tables 3 and 4 respectively. Column 2 estimates from Table 5. Column 3: 
∂P/∂RULC is calculated as ∂P/∂ULC (from Table 5) divided by 1-∂P/∂ULC. Column 6: ET is total employment, 
ED depenent employment. Column 7: G&S: extra-EU12 exports of goods and services, G: extra-EU12 exports 
of goods. 
 
The effect of an increase in the wage share by 1%-point on the net export share thus totals -
0.16 (and was -0.11 at the mean of the period). The difference between these two values 
reflects the increasing importance of international trade or globalization. Conveniently, the 
differences are not large enough to modify the overall result. 
 
4.4 Total effects 
Table 7 puts together the partial results presented above. The results of the different ways to 
calculate the effect on net exports are listed separately. The positive effect of an increase in 
the wage share by one percentage point on private consumption is 0.37 %-points of GDP at 
mean values and 0.43 %-points in 2005. Either is substantially larger than the negative effect 
on investment (0.07 %-points of GDP). The domestic sector of the economy is thus clearly 
wage led. Our estimations suggest that a 1 %-point increase of the wage share (assuming no 
changes in government expenditures and income) leads to an increase of domestic demand by 
0.3 %-points increase in GDP at sample means and and by 0.35 in 2005.  
 
Table 7. Private excess demand (in %-points of GDP) caused by a 1%-point increase of the 
wage share 
  
Effects at mean levels, 
NX-share regression 
Effects in 2005,  
X, M - regression 
Effects at mean levels,  
X, M - regression 
Consumption  0.37 0.43 0.37 
Investment -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Domestic  
excess demand 0.30 0.35 0.30 
Net exports -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 
Private excess demand (h2):  
  0.19 0.17 0.19 
Note. Column “NX-share” estimation of net export share as a function of real unit labor costs and other control 
variables (based on results in Table 3). Columns X, M-regression: based on estimation of exports and imports as 
a function of domestic prices (and other control variables) and of prices as a function of unit labor costs (and 
import prices) (based on results from Table 4 and 5). Private excess demand (h2) is the sum of the effects of a 
change in income distribution on consumption, investment, and net exports given the level of income.  
 
The effect of an increase of the wage share on net exports is stronger than the effect on 
investment. Table 7 lists all three variants of calculating the effect on net exports. First, the 
direct estimation of the net export share as a function of real unit labor costs (and standard 
control variables). This method (labeled “NX-share regression” in Table 7) gives a medium 
effect on net exports, which is -0.13 %-points of GDP. This estimation procedure, however, is 
not how modern macroeconometric models treat foreign trade. Second, exports and imports 
were regressed on the domestic price level (and other control variables) and prices were 
regressed on nominal unit labor costs and import prices. The price equation allows for the 
calculation of the effects of an increase in real unit labor costs. This approach is consistent 
with the present modeling strategy in macroeconometic models. Since the estimations give 
elasticities rather than partial effects, the elasticities have to be converted. As the import and 
exports shares in GDP show a strong trend the results differ (for a given elasticity) if 
evaluated at the mean or at the end of the period. In table 7 the evaluation with the current 
value is referred to as “X, M-regressions, 2005 levels” and gives a value of -0.16. An increase 
of the wage share by one percentage point today would thus decrease net exports by 0.16%-
point of GDP. Alternatively, column “X, M regressions, mean levels” evaluates the marginal 
effect for the export and import shares at the mean values of our sample. This gives an effect 
of -0.11. This can be interpreted as a one percentage point increase in the wage share in the 
middle of the period, i.e. the 1970s, causing a decrease of net exports by 0.11 %-points of 
GDP. 
 
The total effect of a one percentage point increase in the wage share on private excess demand 
(h2 in equation 2) ranges between +0.17 and +0.19 %-points of GDP. In all cases the effect is 
positive. These are conservative estimates. The effect of domestic prices on imports is not 
statistically significant and the coefficient estimate is not robust. The qualitative result of this 
study is thus clear: wage moderation will overall have negative effects on (private) aggregate 
demand in the Euro-area. A plausible, conservative point estimate of the total effect is 0.2 % 
points of GDP. The net results at mean levels are similar to those for 2005. However the 
components do differ. The decreasing wage share has led to a increase in the consumption 
differential, while increases in international trade have led to stronger effect on net exports. 
The fact that these two developments in opposite directions almost cancel out, is mere 
coincidence.  
 
To get the total private effects of a change in income distribution on equilibrium demand 
excess demand has to be multiplied by the multiplier of equation 2, that is 
11
1
h− . This is done 
in Table 8. These calculations have to be interpreted with care for two reasons. First, these 
results are equilibrium effects. The exogeneity assumptions outlined in section 2 seem rather 
strong in this context.20 Second, more technically, the results are very sensitive to the specific 
parameters applied and lack the robustness of the results for excess demand. h1 consists of the 
                                                 
20 Note that the private excess demand effects discussed above are by definition partial (and disequilibrium 
effects). Here, however, the effects are general equilibrium effects. The assumption that other control variables 
are exogenous with respect to income and income distribution, is therefore much more restrictive.  
partial effects of changes in income on consumption, investment and imports. Table 1, 2 and 4 
contain the relevant coefficient estimates. Again, the coefficient estimates are elasticities that 
have to be converted into partial effects.21 For the case of consumption, this elasticity was 
estimated to be 0.6 (Table 1). In the literature the assumption of a long-run elasticity of one is 
frequently found. By assumption, the long-run demand elasticity of investment was one 
(Table 2). The income elasticity of imports is 2.34 (Table 4), which is a rather high value. 
Moreover, it makes a big difference if the elasticity is converted into a partial effect at the 
mean import share or its 2005 value. Depending on the assumption of the long-run 
consumption elasticity and on where the import elasticity is converted the private multiplier 
ranges from 1.38 (with the eCY=1 and the M/Y of 2005) to 2.69 (with eCY=0.6 and the mean 
M/Y).22 The latter values seem rather high. The state sector has been excluded from the 
analysis in this paper. If automatic stabilizers are operating, then the values will be 
accordingly smaller. Assuming an income elasticity of consumption of 0.6 the total effect of a 
1%-point increase in the wage share on equilibrium income is 0.23 %-points of GDP 
(evaluated at the mean import share).  
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22 The multiplier values are 1.66 assuming e =0.6 and mean M/Y and 2.01 assuming  e =1 and 2005 M/Y. CY CY
Table 8. Private equilibrium demand (in %-points of GDP) caused by a 1%-point increase of 
the wage share 
  
NX-share 
regression 
X, M - regression, 
2005 levels 
X, M - regression, 
mean levels 
Private excess demand (h2):  
  0.19 0.17 0.19 
    
Total private demand effects (h2/(1-h1); M-share 2005):  
 0.234 0.263 0.265 
Total private demand effects is private excess demand multiplied by the sum of the effects of a change in income 
on consumption, investment and imports. Row eCY=0.6 calculates total effects based on a long run income 
elasticity of consumption of 0.6 (Table 1). 
 
 
5. Implications for wage policy 
 
The first, and most obvious, policy implication of our findings is that wage moderation in the 
EU is unlikely to stimulate employment. The results presented above suggest that wage 
moderation leads to a (moderate) contraction in output. Since an expansion in output can be 
regarded as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an expansion in employment, wage 
moderation (at the EU level) is not an ‘employment-friendly’ wage policy. This finding is 
consistent with the fact that unemployment has been stable or increasing in the last two 
decades despite substantial declines in real unit labor costs. Thus the first conclusion is that 
rather than wage moderation a return to productivity-oriented wage setting has to be part of 
macroeconomic policy package that is aimed at stimulating demand and employment in 
Europe.  
 
A second implication refers to wage coordination. While our findings suggest that demand is 
wage-led in the Euro area, this finding does not extend to individual Euro member states. 
While the Euro area is a relatively closed economy, its member states typically are rather 
open economies, with most of their trade conducted with other member states. Indeed, the 
parameters estimates imply that the Euro area would switch from a wage-led to a profit-led 
demand regime at export and import shares of 23% to 30%.23 Most EU members have export 
and import shares in this order of magnitude or even higher. It seems therefore likely that 
many EU member states exhibit (individually, not collectively) profit-led demand regimes. In 
other words, small open economies are likely to be profit-led, because foreign trade 
constitutes a much larger share of their GDP.  
 
If this is the case, European wage policy is in a prisoners’ dilemma-type situation. While for 
each country it may be expansionary to exercise wage moderation (assuming constant wages 
abroad), wage moderation in all countries will have a contractionary effect. This is likely to 
generate a downward bias in wage settlements if wages are negotiated nationally. The actual 
situation of course much more complicated. First, the EU consists of countries of varying 
size, with some of them, most notably Germany, being large enough to make a wage-led 
demand regime likely. Second, wage negotiations in fact do not take place at the national 
level, but at the sectoral level or the firm level, with substantial differences in national labor 
relations systems persisting (Visser 2004, Marginson and Sisson 2004). Any concrete policy 
suggestion would have to take into account these complications. However, at the general level 
it seems likely that wage competition fostered by trade integration and increasing FDI flows 
has contributed to reduction in wage growth (Rodrik 1997, Hatzius 2000). A coordination of 
wage bargaing across the Euro area (or the EU in general) therefore seems desirable. 
 
The third conclusion concerns the macro economic policy package currently in place in the 
Euro area, which is defined as a common currency directed by an independent ECB, almost 
                                                 
23 Both figures are based on the second, indirect estimate of the effect on exports and imports (referred to as X, 
M-estimates in Table 7). If the statistically insignificant (and not robust) effect of prices on imports is taken at 
face value, then the switch from a wage-led to a profit-led demand regime occurs at export and import shares of 
23%. If the effect of prices on imports is assumed to be zero, the switch occurs at 30%. 
exclusively concerned with price stability, and a national fiscal policies which is 
(asymmetrically) severely constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. In this setting wage 
policy plays a crucial role as a shock absorber for asymmetric as well as for symmetric 
shocks, which is why the ECB is consistently insisting that labor market flexibility is needed 
to ensure the proper functioning of the monetary union (Alsopp and Artis 2003). However, if 
demand is wage-led in the EU, then flexible wage will send perverse signals in the case of 
adverse demand shocks. Rather than stimulating demand, falling wages (or more precisely 
wage shares) will dampen demand further. Therefore the whole design of the policy package 
in Europe has to be modified. Monetary policy would have to get reoriented to output 
stabilization or fiscal policy would need more room (and coordination) for counter-cyclical 
policy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Variable definitions 
 
Notation Ameco-
Nota
tion 
Description Notes 
C OCPH Private consumption, real - 
E - Exchange rate Index 
(1960=100).gro
wth rate of 
trade-weighted 
exchange rates. 
Exchange rate  
in price 
notation (1 € in 
foreign 
curreny). 
Weights: see 
YW 
ED NWTD dependent employment, 
private sector - 
ET NETD employment, private 
sector - 
Y OVGD GDP, real - 
YW - Trade-weighted GDP of 
main trading partnres, 
real 
Index (1960=100). 
Weighted 
growth rates of 
real GDP of 
main trading 
partner. 
Weights: shares 
of exports of 
EU12, 2000-
2005 Main 
trading 
partners: USA, 
UK, Sweden, 
Japan, 
Switzerland, 
Turkey; from 
1991 also: 
China, Russia, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Hungary, 
Poland. 
(source: 
Eurostat). 
I OIGT Private Investitionen, real - 
i - Long-run interest rate, 
real: deflated by the 
GDP deflator 
source: OECD 
Economic 
Outlook: IRL 
M DMGE Imports, real extra EU12 imports 
of goods 
Belgium, Lux 
from 1999. 
NX - Net exports, real NX = X – M 
R - Gross operating surplus, 
real R = UOGD/PVGD 
P PVGD GDP deflator - 
PM PXGS Import price deflator - 
PX PMGS Export price deflator - 
ULC PLCD Unit labor costs - 
RULC ALCD Real unit labor costs - 
W - Compensation of 
employees, real W = UWCD/PVGD 
X DXGE Exports, real extra EU12 imports 
of goods. 
Belgium, Lux 
from 1999. 
 
 
Table A.2. Unit root tests 
 
  Levels       Differences       
Variable Deterministic Lags 
Test 
stat. Significance Deterministic Lags 
Test 
stat. Significance
ln C c,t 1 -2.054 - c 0 -2.985 *** 
ln W c,t 1 -2.090 - c 0 -2.405 ** 
ln R c,t 0 -2.161 - c 0 -5.204 *** 
ln I c,t 1 -2.878 * c 0 -3.823 *** 
ln Y c,t 0 -2.607 - c 0 -3.969 *** 
i c 0 -1.370 - c 0 -6.150 *** 
ln X c,t 0 -1.721 - c 0 -5.678 *** 
ln YW c,t 1 -3.125 ** c 0 -4.696 *** 
ln Ex c 0 -2.258 ** c 0 -5.559 *** 
ln Px/Pm c 1 -3.278 *** c 0 -5.529 *** 
ln M c,t 0 -1.632 - c 0 -6.150 *** 
ln P/Pm c 0 -1.027 - c 0 -5.126 *** 
NX/Y c 0 -2.512 ** c 1 -5.927 *** 
RULC c 1 -0.040 - c 0 -4.571 *** 
ln Px c,t 1 -0.820 - c 0 -3.182 *** 
ln Pm c,t 1 -1.059 - c 0 -4.081 *** 
ln P c,t 1 -1.855 - c 0 -0.937 - 
ln ULC c,t 1 -1.083 - c 0 -1.533 * 
Note: Critical values according to Charemza and Deadman (1997). *** = statistically 
significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%, * = statistically significant at 10%. 
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